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CASE NOTES
probably entirely eliminate the distribution system. In conclusion it is
hoped that in the future that the instant case will be treated as sui generis
and the Court's comprehensive language will not be sweepingly applied
to categorize attempts at restricted distribution as per se violations of the
Sherman Act.
Bruce Bauer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BALANCING OF FREE PRESS
AND FAIR TRIAL-INHERENT PREJUDICE FROM
MASS PUBLICITY
In 1954, Dr. Samuel Sheppard was convicted of murdering his wife.
Sensational publicity attended the murder investigation and trial, saturat-
ing the community with prejudice. In addition, it was alleged that the trial
judge's permissive attitude toward the press resulted in disorder in the
courtroom.' In 1964 the United States District Court of Ohio, upon a
writ of habeas corpus, held that Sheppard was not afforded a fair trial. The
Court of Appeals reversed by a divided vote, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the failure
of the trial judge to protect the trial from inherent prejudicial publicity
deprived Sheppard of a fair trial consistent with due process. The court-
room lacked the "judicial serenity and calm to which he was entitled."'2
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
The Sheppard case represents a classic example of publicity interfering
with the trial process. There has been a prevalence of such interference in
recent years, due to the development of mass communication media. Pos-
sibly in response to this, the High Court in the Sheppard case sets forth
suggestions for the prevention of prejudice in future trials. This note will
I Sheppard was convicted in 1954 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County,
Ohio. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,
State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955), and the Ohio Supreme
Court, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340 (1956). The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on the original appeal. 352 U.S. 910 (1956).
Examples of the prejudicial publicity and the trial judge's errors may be enumerated:
a three day televised inquest in which Sheppard's counsel were not allowed to par-
ticipate; articles in all three Cleveland newspapers stressing Sheppard's alleged extra-
marital affairs as a murder motive; repeated criminating statements by law enforcement
personnel; publication in all three Cleveland newspapers of the veniremen and their
addresses, resulting in letters and calls to all of them; the trial judge's permitting a news
table to be set up within the bar and directly in back of counsel table; his failure
to question jurors as to their exposure to news publicity; his failure to sequester the
jury.
2 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,334 (1966). Accord, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
passim (1965).
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consider the restraints made available to the trial court, and how effective
they can be in light of the constitutional guaranty to a free press. How-
ever, the atmosphere in the trial court and the impartiality of jurors can-
not be polluted with prejudicial publicity. Thus, the court must weigh its
restraints on the press against the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Freedom of speech and press, secured by the first amendment against
abridgment by the Federal Government, is secured by the fourteenth
amendment against abridgment by a state.8 However, in Pennekamp v.
Florida,4 the Supreme Court pointed out that freedom of speech is not
absolute, and that a balance must be struck between freedom of speech
and a defendant's right to a fair trial.5 In Toledo Newspaper Company v.
United States," the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable tendency test
to determine when prejudicial publications could be punished by con-
tempt. Accordingly, publications tending to obstruct justice could be
punished. This limitation on freedom of press afforded the judiciary a
workable tool to prevent or impugn prejudicial publicity.
The Supreme Court, however, discarded the reasonable tendency test in
the case of Bridges v. CaliforniaJ and reversed a contempt conviction on
the grounds that only a clear and present danger to the orderly adminis-
tration of justice is sufficient for a court to find contempt., Today, free-
dom of press cannot be restricted unless the publications are "a serious and
imminent threat to the administration of justice."9
This liberal interpretation of freedom of press is based on the theory
that "a trial is a public event [and] what transpires in the courtroom is
public property." 10 However, this would seem to be somewhat inaccurate
for the right to a public trial is really for the benefit of the accused, and it
is not intended to benefit the public." Historically, public trials were
3 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Accord, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
4328 U.S. 331 (1946).
51d. at 354-355; See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See generally,
LeWine, What Constitutes Prejudicial Publicity in Pending Cases, 51 A.B.A.J. 942
(1965); CooLEY, A TREATISE ON ThE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 604 (1903).
6 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
7 Supra note 3. The discussion of contempt in this case note is limited to contempt due
to out of court publications, and not contempt committed within the presence of the
court, which is subject to summary punishment by the judge.
8 E.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 4; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Wood v. Georgia, 730 U.S. 375 (1962). See generally, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
9 Craig v. Harney, supra note 8, at 373. 10 ld. at 374.
"1 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 57 (1948). Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, DEPAUL L.
REv. 197 (1963).
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adopted for criminal defendants as a safeguard against their persecution by
the courts through secret trials.12 Therefore, access of the press to the
courtroom was "not based on any inherent right which it enjoys, but
stems from the right of the accused to a fair trial and the assumption that
the press will further this end.' u Thus, it would seem that the right of the
press to be present at trials and to report proceedings is subordinate to the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Massive prejudicial publicity, like that in the Sheppard case, deprives a
defendant of a fair trial by creating impressions which may cause the
jurors to become partial. One basic element of a fair trial is that the de-
fendant's case be tried in the "calmness and solemnity of the courtroom
according to legal procedures.' 4 Even more important, however, is that
fundamental fairness be present in these legal procedures. The Supreme
Court has reversed numerous convictions because fundamental fairness
was lacking even though the formalities of trial were observed.' 5 In Moore
v. Dempsey,'6 the Court held that the atmosphere in and around the
courtroom may be so hostile as to interfere with the trial process although
the record would disclose no procedural error.
Impartiality of the jurors is another prerequisite to a fair trial. Where
the press saturates a community with prejudicial publicity, the greatest
threat to a fair trial is that the jurors may "be torn from their moorings of
impartiality by the undertow of extraneous influence."' 7 A jury's verdict
must be based only upon the evidence developed at the trial, "[t]his is
true regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged, the apparent guilt
of the offender, or the station in life which he occupies."'
In the Sheppard case, the presence of a news table within the bar, a
three day televised inquest without benefit of counsel and the access of
newsmen to witnesses, were a few of the facts which gave rise to the
12In re Oliver, supra note 11. See also, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940),
which contains a good discussion of the historical development of the right to a public
trial.
13 Will, supra note 11, at 203; Brief for the National Association of Broadcasters
and Radio-Television News Directors Association as Amicus Curiae, p. 7, Estes v.
Texas, supra note 2, to the effect that the Constitution gave broadcasters no unlimited
right of access to the courtroom. See generally, 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834 (3d ed.
1940) on what spectators may be excluded from a criminal trial.
14 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965).
15 Estes v. Texas, supra note 2; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915) (Holmes,
J. dissenting). See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S.
28 (1957); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
18 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
17 Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 4, at 366.
18 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). For the proper development of evidence,
Patterson v. Colorado, supra note 5.
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court's finding of inherent prejudice.19 The Supreme Court made such a
finding without requiring the defense counsel to illustrate a causal rela-
tionship between any allegedly prejudicial fact and resulting jury prej-
udice.
Early cases of prejudice required a specific showing of prejudice by
defense counsel. 20 Needless to say, it was not always possible to pinpoint
specific instances of prejudice effectively enough to win a reversal. In
Stroble v. California,21 the Supreme Court affirmed a murder conviction
in spite of some evidence of news prejudice. The Court held that there
was not a sufficient finding of prejudice because four days after the de-
fendant released his confession to the press the same confession was ad-
mitted into the record. The Stroble case represents the early quantitative
measure of prejudice, allowing extraneous influence to enter the trial
process, so long as no specific instance of prejudice could be shown. In
Marshall v. United States,2 2 however, the Supreme Court ordered a new
trial, even though seven of the jurors stated that they could render an im-
partial judgment, because news articles had reported prior convictions of
the defendants. Such information constitutes one of the more serious
types of prejudicial news.23
In Irvin v. Dowd, 24 the Supreme Court first recognized the subtle and
damaging manner in which prejudice can pervade the trial atmosphere
without always being apparent through specific instances of jury preju-
dice. The Court found that the defendant's murder conviction was the
product of jury partiality due to intensive news coverage of the trial. In
granting habeas corpus the Court said that, "With his life at stake, it is not
requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed
by so huge a wave of public passion .... 25 With this decision the Supreme
Court distinguished the evil of prejudicial publicity from the other impedi-
ments to a fair trial. "[A]gain and again, such disregard of fundamental
fairness is so flagrant that the Court is compelled ... to reverse a convic-
tion in which prejudicial newspaper intrusion has poisoned the out-
come."'26 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the Irvin case, noted that,
with the prevalence of prejudicial publicity, in some cases "an accused is
forced, as a practical matter, to forego trial by jury."27
19 For a more detailed list of instances of prejudicial publicity and error by the trial
judge in the Sheppard case see supra note 1.
20 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
21 Ibid. 23 LeWine, supra note 5.
22 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 24 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
25 Id. at 728; accord, Stroble v. California, supra note 20; Shepard v. Florida, 341
U.S. 50 (1951) (concurring opinion); Moore v. Dempsey, supra note 16.
26 Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 18, at 730. 27 Ibid.
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In Rideau v. Louisiana,28 the Supreme Court enunciated the rule that the
televising of a defendant confessing to a crime was inherently invalid un-
der the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment even without a
showing of prejudice. The requirement of showing actual prejudice, as in
the past, was discarded in the Rideau case on the theory that the law in-
tended to prevent even the probability of unfairness. More recently, in
Estes v. Texas,29 the televising of a criminal trial itself was found to be
inherently a denial of due process. The Sheppard case extends this rule by
holding that any massive and sensational publicity by the press is inherent-
ly prejudicial to the trial process.
However, the Sheppard decision says something far more important, for
the Court has enunciated the need for trial level restraints which will effec-
tively curb the proliferation of prejudice. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for
the Court, stated that present methods of assuring a fair trial "would have
been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial and so [we] do not con-
sider what sanctions might be available against a recalcitrant press .... the
carnival atmosphere at trial could have been avoided"80 by the trial judge.
The trial judge must take the initiative to implement present methods and
supplement these methods with rules and regulations of his own.
The primary trial court remedy available against a prejudicial atmos-
phere is change of venue.81 As an alternative the court may grant a con-
tinuance in order to allow community passion to recede.82 In Delaney v.
United States 8 the Court found that where judicial elections are forth-
coming it may be necessary to continue a case until after the elections in
order to assure a fair trial. In the Sheppard case both the judge and chief
prosecutor were candidates for judgeships in hotly contested elections. In
such a situation the candidates may be tempted to use the trial to add
impetus to their election campaign. For this reason a continuance should
be granted. However, no continuance was granted in the Sheppard case
although defense counsel requested it at the commencement of trial.
Nevertheless, in instances of extreme prejudice, where a case achieves na-
tional notoriety, the above mentioned remedies may prove ineffective in
securing a fair trial for the defendant.3 4 Thus, two other trial court reme-
28 373 U.S. 723 (1963). Defendant's confession to robbery, kidnapping, and murder
was televised three times and resulted in prejudice to the defendant's trial.
29 Supra note 2. 80 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2.
81 Rideau v. Louisiana, supra note 28; Chambers v. Florida, supra note 12.
32 Comment, 33 U. CHL L. Rv. 512 (1966), for a discussion of the defendant cen-
tered remedies designed to avoid trial prejudice.
88 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
34See Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial Reporting in Crim-
inal Cases, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 1 (1965); KAPLAN & WALTz, THE TRIAL OF JACK
RUBY, 37, 69-90 (1965), for a treatment of the extraordinary publicity surrounding
the Ruby case.
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dies are available, the granting of a new trial35 and the reversal of convic-
tions on appeal.36 However, reversing convictions is an expedient and not
a cure for the problem of trial prejudice, as are all the aforementioned
remedies.
Mr. Justice Clark, in the Sheppard case, enumerated additional permis-
sible means available to the trial judge to control order in the courtroom
and prevent prejudicial publicity from outside: (1) adopting strict rules
governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen, and limiting the number
of reporters in the courtroom; (2) controlling the release of leads, infor-
mation and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses and counsel for
both sides; (3) warning the newspapers to check the accuracy and propri-
ety of their accounts; (4) requesting city and county officials to promul-
gate a regulation with respect to dissemination of information about the
case.
37
A basic question is raised by the Court's suggested controls, whether
they are effective and do in fact, strike at the cause of trial prejudice. Con-
trolling newsmen in the courtroom is necessary but it does not effectively
hinder the primary cause of prejudice. It is the activity by the press out-
side the courtroom, in writing and broadcasting prejudicial accounts of
the trial and making disclosures of facts, that is the true source of preju-
dice. Controlling the release of information to the press is necessary, but
the news media often conducts its own thorough investigations, sometimes
collecting pertinent evidence before law enforcement officials.
A warning to the newspapers to check the accuracy of their accounts
and the propriety of their disclosures, as suggested by Justice Clark, strikes
more directly at the source of prejudicial publicity. However, the Court
is restrained from doing much more than just warn the press. Only a clear
and present danger to the orderly administration of justice can be pro-
hibited under the present limitation on freedom of press. If "the trial
courts must take strong measures to insure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused,"3 8 the Supreme Court or Congress may have
to initiate these measures.
The Sheppard decision is apparently intended to provoke the trial courts
to challenge the press and create a new opportunity for the Supreme
35 On the supervisory power of the court to grant a new trial, Marshall v. United
States, supra note 22.
3 Estes v. Texas, supra note 2, at 536, where the Court said it had "on numerous
occasions reversed convictions ...because the extreme prejudice inherent in the
practice required its condemnation on constitutional grounds." Footnote 22 in the
Estes decision cites many such reversals.
37 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2, the suggestions to the trial court are repeated
in numerous instances in the decision.
38 Id. at 362.
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Court to pass on what is permissible conduct within freedom of press. By
stating "the courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will
protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences," 39 the Su-
preme Court is giving judicial approval to a trial court initiative in this
area. Whether the trial courts will provide an effective deterrent to prej-
udicial publicity is still conjectural. However, one must remember that
there are some desirable effects of criminal publicity. It is the watchdog of
the judicial system,40 and an effective weapon against corruption of
police, prosecutors, and other law enforcement personnel.41 Also, pre-
trial publicity reduces community anxiety where the arrest of key suspects
is made known to the public. 42 Though the Court has opened the door to
further restraints on the press, it remains to be seen to what extent a court
may actually curtail the dissemination of news.
Robert Kopple
39 Ibid.
40 Supra note 32; See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the first of the "Scotts-
boro Cases," where publicity insured ultimate justice for nine Negroes put on trial
in the South.
41 Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 504, 512 (1965).
42 See CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (1966), to illustrate arousal of anxiety in the community
where a sensational crime is unsolved.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOYALTY OATH-SPECIFIC
INTENT REQUIRED FOR VALIDITY
Petitioner, a school teacher, refused to take the loyalty oath required
of all public officers and employees of the state of Arizona. The oath,
together with an accompanying statutory gloss,1 proscribed knowing
1ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. S 38-231(e) (Supp. 1965) reads as follows: "Any officer or
employee as defined in this section having taken the form of oath or affirmation pre-
scribed by this section, and knowingly or wilfully at the time of subscribing the oath
or affirmation, or at any time thereafter during his term of office or employment, does
commit or aid in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the
government of this state or of any of its political subdivisions, or advocates the over-
throw by force or violence of the government of this state or of any of its political
subdivisions, or during such term of office or employment knowingly and wilfully be-
comes or remains a member of the communist party of the United States or its succes-
sors or any of its subordinate organizations or any other organization having for one
of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the state of
Arizona or any of its political subdivisions, and said officer or employee as defined in
this section prior to becoming or remaining a member of such organization or organi-
zations had knowledge of said unlawful purpose of said organization or organizations,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to all the
penalties for perjury; in addition, upon conviction under this section, the officer or
employee shall be deemed discharged from said office or employment and shall not be
